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NOTE
A CIRCUIT SPLIT ON JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE: INTERPRETING ASYLUM
CLAIMS BY FIANCES AND BOYFRIENDS OF
VICTIMS OF CHINA'S COERCIVE FAMILY
PLANNING POLICIES
NICHOLAS CUTAIAt
INTRODUCTION
Determining who qualifies for asylum under United States
law is a complex task based in large part on prevailing
international norms about fundamental rights.1 The grant of
asylum to an individual serves as recognition of profound harm-
that it would be unreasonable and cruel to return a refugee
facing persecution to his or her home country.2 Under U.S. law,
however, asylum eligibility requires not a violation of
international norms, but that an applicant qualifies as a
"refugee."3 This "refugee" definition, as much as our consciences
may demand otherwise, cannot incorporate each and every victim
of maltreatment or persecution. Rather, it demonstrates that our
national immigration policy has limits, and is constrained by
finite governmental resources, issues of proof, and differences
t J.D. Candidate, June 2007, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2000,
Tufts University.
I See Robert D. Sloane, An Offer of Firm Resettlement, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 47, 68-69 (2004) (depicting asylum as a "profound moral judgment" made by
the international community designed to protect "certain shared values").
2 See Frederick B. Baer, Recent Development, International Refugees as
Political Weapons, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 243, 247 (1996) (defining the principle of non-
refoulement, which "prohibits states from expelling refugees, if the refugees would
be forced to return to a country where their 'life or freedom would be threatened on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion'" (quoting Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33,
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 137)).
3 See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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over what practices actually constitute persecution.4 Drawing
the line between applicants who do and do not qualify under U.S.
law is a difficult, case-by-case task.5
One example illustrating the complexity of this task relates
to the practice of forced abortion and sterilization. With direct
victims, the decision may seem easy. Most agree that forcible
abortion and sterilization comprise egregious human rights
violations.6 In fact, in 1996 Congress codified this prevailing
norm by enacting legislation aimed at providing specific relief for
such victims, particularly for those who suffered under the
coercive family planning policies of the People's Republic of
China ("PRC"). 7  This legislation-the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA")-provides
per se asylum eligibility for direct victims of forced abortions or
sterilizations.8
A more complicated question is whether per se eligibility
should be extended to husbands or boyfriends seeking asylum
based solely on their wives' or girlfriends' forced abortion or
sterilization. This Note discusses the split among the Second,9
Third, 10 and Ninth 1' Circuit Courts of Appeals, and addresses
questions that stem from this judicial disagreement. The first
substantive issue is whether the derivative harm caused by a
forcible abortion or sterilization meets the "persecution"
requirement as set forth by the IIRIRA. 12 Unquestionably-from
a moral perspective-abortion or sterilization harms a husband's
4 See lao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting "caseload
pressures" and "resource constraints" in asylum petitions); see also Heather A.
Leary, The Nature of Global Commitments and Obligations: Limits on State
Sovereignty in the Area of Asylum, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 297, 298 (1997)
(stating that "it is important to analyze the way in which we should limit the
number of persons who can claim refugee or asylum status.").
5 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996) ("Determining the credibility of
the applicant and whether the actual or threatened harm rises to the level of
persecution is a difficult and complex task ... ").
6 See Stanford M. Lin, Recent Development, China's One-Couple, One-Child
Family Planning Policy as Grounds for Granting Asylum-Xin-Chang Zhang v.
Slattery, No. 94 Civ. 2119 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 5, 1994), 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 231, 242
(1995) ("Forced sterilization and abortion no doubt contravene universally
recognized fundamental rights . .
7 See infra Part I.
8 See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
9 See Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005).
10 See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004).
11 See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004).
12 See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 80:13071308
COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING POLICIES
or boyfriend's fundamental right to procreate; 13 in the case of
forcible sterilization, he loses his ability to have children with his
partner, and in the case of forcible abortion, he loses his own
child. Yet courts disagree over the Board of Immigration
Appeals' ("BIA") determination that legally married husbands of
forcibly sterilized spouses are deemed to be persecuted, but
husbands married in traditional ceremonies not recognized by
the state, as well as boyfriends and fianc6s, are not also eligible
for such imputed persecution. The second, and perhaps more
important, question concerns the level of deference a court must
show to decisions of the BIA. Is the issue of asylum eligibility
within the exclusive purview of the BIA-which has primary
authority to determine asylum eligibility-or can a federal court
that hears an appeal overrule a BIA interpretation?
This Note addresses these two questions-(1) whether the
forcible sterilization of a wife or girlfriend is an act of persecution
against a husband, fianc6, or boyfriend, and (2) what level of
deference must a federal appeals court show to a determination
by the BIA-and argues that the Third and Ninth Circuits, while
coming to contrary determinations in the cases at issue,
misapplied the required principle of judicial deference to
administrative agencies, and consequently intruded upon the
BIA's authority. The Third Circuit deferred to the BIA, implicitly
ratifying a BIA interpretation that the court should have instead
recognized as unsound.14  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit
identified the BIA's weak reasoning, but inappropriately set forth
its own interpretation and construction of the statute.15 This
Note endorses the approach applied by the Second Circuit,,
namely, its recognition that the BIA's statutory construction was
unsound but that remand, rather than adjudication or analysis of
the issue, was appropriate. 16 This Note concludes by briefly
13 See Yuan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting
that the right to have offspring is shared by a married couple, and if denied to one, it
is denied to both).
14 Chen, 381 F.3d at 224 (writing that "[h]ere, there is no dispute that the BIA
should be accorded Chevron deference" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
15 Ma, 361 F.3d at 558-59 ("The BIA's refusal to grant asylum ... leads to
absurd and wholly unacceptable results.").
16 In the subsequent case, Ci Pan v. United States Attorney General, 449 F.3d
408 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam), the court again remanded to the BIA to allow the
agency to answer the same question posed by its reasoning in In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. &
N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997). See Ci Pan, 449 F.3d at 409.
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discussing similar unresolved issues that have arisen under the
language of the IIRIRA, suggesting that the Second Circuit's
approach is a useful means of encouraging the BIA to promulgate
meaningful interpretations of the statute without intruding upon
its authority to decide such questions in the first instance.
Part I provides a brief overview of China's coercive family
planning policies and sets out the legislative response
authorizing asylum eligibility for qualified victims of those
policies. Part II summarizes the principles of administrative
deference in connection with immigration and asylum law.
Part III begins by explaining the facts and holding of In re C- Y-Z-
,17 the precedent BIA case interpreting the language of the
IIRIRA as granting per se asylum eligibility to legally married
husbands of victims of forced abortion or sterilization. Part III
discusses the facts and holdings of the three circuit court cases
examining the BIA's subsequent determinations that the grant of
per se eligibility does not extend to unrecognized husbands,
fiancs, or boyfriends. Part IV examines why both the Third and
Ninth Circuits-while coming to opposite conclusions on the
substantive issue-failed to accord the BIA's determination
proper deference, and thus encroached on the BIA's authority to
provide a reasoned analysis for its statutory construction. This
Note then advocates the approach and analysis employed by the
Second Circuit. Finally, Part V highlights the importance of
these decisions in the larger context of adjudicating issues of
statutory construction under the IIRIRA.
I. CHINA'S COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING POLICIES,
AND THE U.S. RESPONSE
In 1979, responding to a population boom during the
previous two decades, the People's Republic of China initiated a
family planning program aimed at limiting its population
growth.1 8  The core component of this policy-still in effect
today-forbids couples from having more than one child under
threat of various sanctions, 19 including fines, the withholding of
17 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997).
18 See Anne M. Gomez, The New INS Guidelines on Gender Persecution: Their
Effect on Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing the Forced Sterilization and
Abortion Policies of the People's Republic of China, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
621, 623 (1996).
19 For a detailed discussion of the implementation and consequences of the PRC
[Vol. 80:13071310
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social services, demotion, and loss of employment. 20 Violators
also risk physical harassment by local authorities, 21 to whom the
PRC delegates the responsibility of enforcing its family-planning
policies. While the central government "officially" condemns the
use of coercive methods, the decentralized structure of
enforcement has resulted in the widely publicized punishment of
forcible abortion and sterilization. 22  The frequency of these
procedures has waned since the 1980s and varies by province,
but generally entails women being forcibly removed from their
homes into hospitals in order to undergo abortions. 23
Alternatively, a woman may be allowed to carry the baby to term,
after which either she or her husband/boyfriend is sterilized
without consent. 24 While a more in-depth examination of the
PRC's policies is beyond the scope of this Note, debate remains as
to whether its efforts toward reform have actually reduced the
coercion, forced abortions, and infanticide long associated with
such policies. 25
policies, see Gerrie Zhang, U.S. Asylum Policy and Population Control in the People's
Republic of China, 18 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 557, 560-74 (1996) (discussing Chinese
history, demographics, and government practices); see also Gomez, supra note 18, at
623-24 (addressing enforcement of the one-couple, one-child policy).
20 See Gomez, supra note 18, at 623. Local officials are primarily responsible for
implementing the PRC's family planning program, and the methods of ensuring
compliance vary by province. See Zhang, supra note 19, at 569.
21 See Gomez, supra note 18, at 624 ("[M]any local officials engage in physical
coercion, such as forcing women to have abortions, and forcing men and women to be
sterilized. Some of these abortions and sterilizations begin with the subjects being
dragged from their homes in the middle of the night.") (internal citations omitted).
22 See Zhang, supra note 19, at 569-70 (noting reports of forced procedures
occurring in "remote, rural areas"); see also Leary, supra note 4, at 304 (providing a
cursory description of China's policies).
23 See, e.g., Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 749 (7th Cir. 2004). But cf. Cleo J.
Kung, Supporting the Snakeheads: Human Smuggling from China and the 1996
Amendment to the U.S. Statutory Definition of "Refugee," 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1271, 1297-98 (2000) (arguing that forced abortions and sterilizations
are the exception rather than the norm, and that such procedures are perpetrated by
corrupt local officials rather than attributable to the PRC's national policy).
24 See China: Human Rights Violations and Coercion in One-Child Policy
Enforcement: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Sec'y, Bureau of Population, Refugees &
Migration, U.S. Dep't of State), available at http://wwwc.house.gov/international-
relations/108/dewl21404.htm.
25 See Jim Abrams, Abuse of One-Child Program Decried, TORONTO STAR, Dec.
19, 2004 (referring to State Department officials' testimony in concluding that
"coercion, forced abortions, infanticide and perilously imbalanced boy-girl ratios"
remain).
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The PRC's "coercive family planning policy" 26 has stirred a
significant amount of outrage in the United States,27 giving rise
to a strong political will toward providing asylum eligibility for
its victims. 28 A principal catalyst for this effort was the 1989 BIA
decision in Matter of Chang.29 Chang held that a coercive family
planning policy that includes forced sterilization does not
constitute "persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,"30
and consequently, that a victim of such a procedure does not
meet the "refugee" definition. Later that year, Congress-
unhappy with the result in Chang-proposed unsuccessful
legislation seeking to overturn that decision.31  The push
continued in 1990, when President Bush issued an Executive
Order directing the Secretary of State and Attorney General to
provide "enhanced consideration" under the immigration laws for
those individuals expressing fear of persecution related to their
home country's policy of forced abortion or sterilization. 32
Nevertheless, the BIA continued to adhere to the precedent set
by Chang.
In 1996, Congress passed section 101(a)(42)(B) of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("1996 Amendment"), 33 finally giving legislative bite to practices
it deemed among the most extreme and egregious human rights
abuses in the world.34 The IIRIRA amended the Immigration
and Nationality Act ("INA") of 1980 ("1980 Act"), the core
legislation governing asylum eligibility. 35  The particular
26 U.S. courts generally refer to the PRC's population program as a "coercive
family planning' policy. See, e.g., Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 2004).
27 See Zhang, supra note 19, at 572 (describing U.S. reaction).
28 See id. at 578 (quoting the Attorney General's announcement in 1988
directing those adjudicating asylum claims to give "careful consideration" to
applicants fearing persecution as a result of the PRC's population control policies);
see also Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, H.R. 2712, 101st
Cong. § 3(a) (1989) (implementing the Attorney General's policy).
29 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1989).
30 See id. at 47 (quoting the Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
31 President Bush supported this legislation but vetoed it because of concerns
with other portions of the bill. See Lin, supra note 6, at 237.
32 See Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (Apr. 13, 1990).
33 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).
34 See H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996) (depicting abuses as
"undeniable and grotesque").
35 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537; see, e.g., Gonzales v. Thomas, 126 S.Ct. 1613, 1613
1312 [Vol. 80:1307
COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING POLICIES
provision of the 1996 Amendment covering victims of forced
abortion and sterilization provides:
A person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to
undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted
for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other
resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be
deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion,
and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be
forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for
such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a
well founded fear of persecution on account of political
opinion.36
The 1996 Amendment expressly overruled the BIA's decision
in Matter of Chang,37 and clarified the requirements faced by a
victim of a forced abortion or sterilization when applying for
asylum.38 Generally, all aliens seeking asylum must prove that
they qualify as a "refugee" under codified sections 1101(a)(42)(A)
and (B) of the 1980 Act.3 9 An applicant meets the refugee
standard by proving that: (1) he or she has a fear of persecution;
(2) the fear is well-founded; (3) he or she suffered persecution on
(2006) (discussing the circumstances under which the INA permits the Attorney
General to grant asylum).
36 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).
37 Paula Abrams, Population Politics: Reproductive Rights and U.S. Asylum
Policy, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 881, 885 (2000).
38 The final grant of asylum is at the discretion of the Attorney General. See
James M. Wines, Note, Guo Chun Di v. Carroll: The Refugee Status of Chinese
Nationals Fleeing Persecution Resulting from China's Coercive Population Control
Measures, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 685, 699 (1995) (quoting statutory text).
39 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)-(B). In relevant part, the term refugee is defined as
follows:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality,
is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or
(B) in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate
consultation... may specify, any person who is within the country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within
the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is
persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
20061 1313
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion; and (4) he or she is unwilling to
return to the country of nationality because of this well-founded
fear of persecution.40 The 1996 Amendment relieved forced
abortion or sterilization victims of the burden of proving element
(3)-namely, persecution on account of one of the established
statutory grounds. Forced abortion or sterilization is now
classified as persecution based on political opinion.41
The 1996 Amendment is separable into four discrete
conditions under which asylum applicants may allege past
persecution: "(a) the applicant has been forced to abort a
pregnancy, (b) the applicant has undergone involuntary
sterilization, (c) the applicant has been persecuted for failing or
refusing to undergo such a procedure, or (d) the applicant has
been persecuted for other resistance to a coercive population
control program."42
Before examining the circuit court asylum claims made by
unrecognized husbands, boyfriends, and fianc6s, it is first useful
to distinguish among the four conditions under which an
applicant may allege past persecution. The first two conditions
of the 1996 Amendment grant automatic persecution status to
individuals without assessing the severity of the harm suffered. 43
In the hearings and reports leading up to the Amendment's
passage, it is clear that Congress recognized the extreme and
gruesome nature of a forced abortion or sterilization 44 and thus
eliminated the necessary showing of persecution for these
victims. Yet the remaining two conditions-relating to refusals
to undergo procedures or resistance to coercive family planning
40 Wines, supra note 38, at 699.
41 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).
42 Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2004).
43 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).
44 See H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996) (describing coercive abortion or
sterilization as "undeniable and grotesque violations of fundamental human rights");
Zhao v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 92 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Coercive
Population Control in China: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations &
Human Rights of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 104th Cong. 30 (1995) (statement of
Rep. Smith, Chair, House Subcomm. on Int'l Operations & Human Rights)) (stating
that "forced abortion and forced sterilization [are] particularly gruesome violations
of fundamental human rights") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Y-
T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601, 607 (BIA 2003) (pointing out that "[i]n the long course of
administrative rulings, Presidential directives, proposed regulations, and
congressional action..., the profound and permanent nature of [coerced
sterilization] has rarely, if ever, been called into question").
[Vol. 80:13071314
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programs-require a showing of persecution independent of the
act of resistance. 45 This means that an applicant must show that
such refusal or resistance rises to the level of persecution. 46 The
distinction is important, signifying that per se persecution status
exists only for direct victims of forced abortion or sterilizations.
While it is clear that Congress intended the statute to cover
victims other than those directly experiencing forced abortion or
sterilization, a grant to indirect victims-such as boyfriends or
fianc6s-must be justified under some other form of analysis.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DEFERENCE AND THE BIA REGULATIONS
A. Chevron Deference and its Progeny
In order to properly understand the split among the Second,
Third, and Ninth Circuits as to whether a boyfriend or fianc6
qualifies for asylum, it is necessary to examine the appropriate
level of deference owed by courts to administrative agency
decisions. In general, as set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,47 when reviewing an
administrative agency's construction of a particular statute, a
court must apply the principle of deference. 48 Chevron deference
involves a two-part determination.49 First, a court asks whether
the language of the statute addresses the specific issue in
question. 50 If so, the particular language of the statute controls
the determination of that issue.51 If the statutory language does
not speak to the issue in question, then the second part of the
standard requires that a court limit its examination only to the
reasonableness of the administrative agency's statutory inter-
pretation.5 2 Key to this analysis is the precept that a court may
45 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).
46 Id.
47 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
48 See id. at 844 (describing the high level of deference afforded administrative
decisions).
49 See id. at 842; John W. Guendelsberger, Judicial Deference to Agency
Decisions in Removal Proceedings in Light of INS v. Ventura, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
605, 618 (2004) (noting the two-step process).
50 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 843 ("[T]he question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute."); Guendelsberger, supra note 49,
at 618 ("[T]he court is limited to assessing whether the agency's interpretation of the
statute is reasonable."); see also Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 223-24 (3d Cir.
20061 1315
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not impose its own construction of the statute in place of that of
an administrative agency. 53
The principle of Chevron deference has been repeatedly
affirmed and refined since its declaration in 1984, especially as it
relates to immigration law.5 4 In Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Abudu,55 the Supreme Court noted that judicial
deference to a decision by the Executive Branch is particularly
appropriate in the immigration context, where officials "exercise
especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of
foreign relations."56 In Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Aguirre-Aguirre,57 the Court affirmed Chevron's two-step
process, stating that the Attorney General has "vested the BIA
with power to exercise the 'discretion and authority conferred
upon the Attorney General by law' in the course of 'considering
and determining cases before it.' "58 Consequently, BIA decisions
should be accorded significant deference under Chevron, as that
agency "gives ambiguous statutory terms 'concrete meaning
through a process of case-by-case adjudication.' "59 In United
States v. Mead,60 the Court narrowed Chevron's applicability by
creating two additional requirements. First, Congress must have
delegated general authority to the administrative agency to
formulate rules that carry "the force of law."61  Second, the
agency interpretation requiring deference "was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority."62  So long as the Mead
requirements are met, however, the Court has continued to
stress the importance of according significant deference to
2004) (illustrating the applicability of Chevron deference to the question of whether
fianc6s or boyfriends are eligible under the language of the 1996 Amendment).
53 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (stating,
in the context of immigration law, that the INA "commits" the definition of its
language "in the first instance to the Attorney General and his delegates, and their
construction and application of this standard should not be overturned by a
reviewing court simply because it may prefer another interpretation of the statute").
54 See Guendelsberger, supra note 49, at 618-19 (noting the Supreme Court's
treatment of federal court deference to BIA decisions in two other cases).
55 485 U.S. 94 (1988).
56 Id. at 110.
57 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
58 Id. at 425 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998)).
59 Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987)).
- 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
61 Id. at 226-27.
62 Id.
1316 [Vol. 80:1307
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administrative decisions. 63 Especially where the agency has not
yet ruled on the issue in question, a court of appeals should
remand cases to the agency for decisions on matters "that
statutes place primarily in agency hands. ' 64  Remand is
appropriate because an administrative agency brings its
specialized expertise to bear upon the particular subject matter
at issue, thus providing an "informed discussion and analysis" for
a later court to review when determining the existence of an
error.
65
B. The Streamlining Regulations of the Board of Immigration
Appeals
In examining the reasoning behind the circuit courts'
inconsistent holdings, it is also helpful to understand both the
BIA's recently streamlined regulations and the stricter standards
imposed by the IIRIRA as a whole. Between 1984 and 2000, the
caseload of the BIA grew from 3,000 to nearly 30,000 appeals. 66
Additional board members were added, and streamlining
regulations were adopted to cope with the BIA's exploding
caseload.67 These provisions, promulgated in 1999 and 2002,
authorize the BIA to issue single member decisions in place of
panel decisions, and to affirm a significant number of additional
cases without opinion. 68 Furthermore, the IIRIRA stripped the
federal courts of jurisdiction over various types of proceedings, 69
63 See Guendelsberger, supra note 49, at 608 (describing how the Court in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam),
relied on broad principles of administrative law to emphasize the importance of
judicial deference).
64 Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16; accord Guendelsberger, supra note 49, at 644 ("When
the issue involves statutory interpretation within the domain of agency authority
delegated by Congress, and the Board's reasoning is insufficient for meaningful
review, the court should remand for a reasoned agency decision on the legal point in
question.").
65 Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17.
66 Guendelsberger, supra note 49, at 612.
67 Id. at 612-13.
68 Id. at 607. Summary affirmances are authorized if: (1) the result below was
correct, (2) any errors were harmless or immaterial, and (3) either the issue on
appeal was clearly controlled by existing BIA or federal court precedent and did not
implicate a novel factual situation, or the factual and legal questions raised on
appeal were not substantial enough for issuance of a written opinion. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(e)(4) (2006); see also Guendelsberger, supra note 49, at 613 (discussing the
reforms introduced by the 2002 regulations).
69 See Guendelsberger, supra note 49, at 616 ("[The limitation] prohibits court
review of discretionary determinations in removal proceedings except for the
2006] 1317
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principally as to "discretionary decisions". 70  With these
restrictions in mind, however, a court can still review a case in
which the BIA's denial of asylum turns on its construction of
provisions of the governing statute.71
Here, the BIA's interpretation of the 1996 Amendment is at
issue, and the courts agree that Congress did not speak precisely
to the issue of whether husbands, boyfriends, or fianc~s are
eligible for asylum based on the direct victimization of their
wives, girlfriends, or fianc6es.72  Thus, the second step of
Chevron-whether the BIA's interpretation is reasonable-must
be assessed. At the same time, in light of the subsequent
Supreme Court rulings on deference toward administrative
decisions, and given the above noted congressional limits on
federal court jurisdiction, courts must proceed lightly, so as not to
encroach on the BIA's primary jurisdiction in this area of the law.
Viewed in this context, it is clear that the Second Circuit adopted
the most cautious and reasoned approach toward reviewing the
BIA's interpretation that only spouses in legally recognized
marriages qualify for per se persecution status. 73
III. THE PRECEDENT C-Y-Z- DECISION,
AND THE EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT
Before addressing the current circuit split as to a fianc6's or
boyfriend's derivative asylum status, one must understand the
BIA's decision in C-Y-Z-. C-Y-Z- served as the basis for all three
of the BIA decisions reviewed by the circuit courts. 74 After
examining C-Y-Z-, this Note presents the facts and holding of
each of the circuit court decisions forming the split, and
undertakes an analysis of each decision's reasoning.
exercise of discretion in granting asylum.").
70 See Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting a court's
limited ability to review discretionary decisions while still allowing review of non-
discretionary statutory interpretations).
71 See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004). The courts in Chen and
Lin failed to even raise the issue, suggesting that they were not concerned about
their jurisdiction to review the BIA's interpretation of the 1996 Amendment.
72 See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that
Chevron deference applies in light of the court's implicit observation that Congress
never spoke directly to the issue).
73 See infra text accompanying notes 129-167.
74 See Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 2005); Chen, 381
F.3d at 227-29; Ma, 361 F.3d at 558-59.
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A. In re C-Y-Z-
In re C- Y-Z- concerned an asylum applicant who was a
citizen of China and who alleged persecution on account of his
opposition to China's family planning policies. 75 After giving
birth to the couple's first child, the applicant's wife underwent
forced insertion of an intrauterine device ("IUD"). 76  The
applicant protested, and was arrested and detained for one day. 77
The IUD was removed, and a short time later the applicant's wife
again became pregnant. 78 Local officials ordered her to undergo
a forced abortion, but the woman went into hiding and eventually
gave birth to her second child.79 As punishment, the government
threatened to destroy the applicant's home; he managed,
however, to pay a fine instead.80 The applicant's wife became
pregnant yet a third time, and she again succeeded in avoiding
detection until birth, at which time the authorities discovered the
baby.81 In response, the woman was forcibly sterilized.8 2
The BIA held that the applicant was eligible "for asylum by
virtue of his wife's forced sterilization."8 3 Its reasoning was very
brief and seemed based solely on "the agreement of the parties
that forced sterilization of one spouse on account of a ground
protected under the Act is an act of persecution against the other
spouse."8 4 The BIA neither referenced the statutory language of
the 1996 Amendment upon which its decision was based, nor
provided an explicit rationale for adopting this view.8 5
Board Member Rosenberg-one of the BIA's appellate panel
members-filed a comparatively lengthy concurrence to the brief
C-Y-Z- opinion.8 6 Rosenberg agreed with the grant of asylum to
75 In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 915-16 (BIA 1997).
76 Id. at 916.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 918.
84 Id. at 919.
85 See id. at 919-20; see also Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 187 (2d
Cir. 2005) (observing that the BIA did not "identify the specific statutory language
pursuant to which it deemed spouses eligible for asylum under IIRIRA § 601(a)").
86 See C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 920-27 (Board Member Rosenberg, concurring).
An additional concurrence and two dissenting opinions were also filed; however, for
brevity's sake, each separate analysis will not be reviewed.
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the applicant, but provided a more reasoned explanation,8 7
arguing that eligibility for asylum should be granted by imputing
the wife's political opinion to her husband.88 Notably, however,
like the majority opinion, Rosenberg did not identify which
statutory language of the 1996 Amendment supported such a
conclusion.8 9
B. Ma v. Ashcroft
The central issue in Ma was the applicant's marital status,
and the case demonstrates how the BIA subsequently used
C-Y-Z- to deny, rather than to grant, asylum to unmarried
partners or to husbands married in traditional-but not state-
recognized-marriages. In Ma, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
BIA's denial of an asylum claim by Ma, a husband alleging
persecution based on his wife's forced abortion. 90 Ma's wife
underwent the procedure upon coming out of hiding; she revealed
herself only after the government took Ma's father into custody
and threatened his life. 91
Ma's marital status was at issue because his age prevented
him from entering into a legally recognized marriage;92 instead,
he had married his wife in a so-called "traditional" ceremony. 93
The BIA, however, refused to extend the C- Y-Z- spousal
eligibility rule to a husband whose marriage was not officially
recognized by the state.94 The BIA stated that proof of a legal
marriage was required for an applicant to qualify as "the spouse
of the person who was allegedly forced to have an abortion."95
87 See id. at 920 ('My agreement is based not only on the specific language of
the statute as amended and the positions of the parties. It is also based on the
relevant precedent decisions of this Board, the Federal courts, and the Supreme
Court, which have construed the elements contained in the refugee definition and
interpreted the proper exercise of discretion in asylum cases.").
88 See id. at 926-27. Rosenberg argued that the statute was intended to operate
within the normal realm of asylum law, and she proceeded with her assessment in
accordance with these principles. See id.
89 See id.
90 See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 554-56 (9th Cir. 2004).
91 Id. at 555-56.
92 Id. at 555.
93 Id.
94 See id. at 554, 558.
95 Id. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Moreover, the BIA found no link between Ma's inability to legally
marry and China's coercive family planning policy.96
While the BIA viewed Ma's marital status as dispositive, the
Ninth Circuit disagreed. 97 The court reversed the BIA's decision
and remanded on the grounds that the agency's distinction
between legally and traditionally married couples contravened
Congress' intent for enacting the 1996 Amendment, and led to
"absurd and wholly unacceptable results."98  The court thus
declined to afford Chevron deference to such an interpretation. 99
In noting that prior courts consistently applied the Amendment's
protection to husbands, it held that the legislative intent of the
1996 Amendment was to provide relief to couples-without
reference to marital status-who have been persecuted on
account of an "unauthorized" pregnancy.100 With such a
purpose-and because China's ban on "underage" marriage
formed an integral part of its coercive family planning policy 1 -
the court found that husbands married in traditional ceremonies
deserve as much protection as those officially married in the eyes
of the law.'0 2 It reasoned that the BIA's relief-restricting rule
would encourage the breakup of the family, a result at odds with
immigration policy as a whole.10 3 Thus, because the Ninth
Circuit determined that the BIA's analysis was premised upon
groundless distinctions, it did not find Chevron deference
applicable. 104
C. Chen v. Ashcroft
C-Y-Z- also supplied the basis for the BIA's denial of asylum
to an applicant as reviewed by the Third Circuit in Chen v.
Ashcroft.10 5 In Chen, the applicant alleged that he was eligible
96 Id.
97 See id. at 558-59.
98 Id. at 559.
99 See id. at 558-59 (explaining the usual level of deference afforded BIA
decisions by the courts, and why this decision did not warrant such deference).
100 Id. at 559 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
101 Id. at 559-60 (citing various sources for the notion that the policy against
early marriages is predicated upon preventing and terminating young pregnancies
and births).
102 See id. at 561.
103 Id. (noting the separation of husband and wife that would result).
104 Id. at 558-59.
105 381 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Notably, the decision was authored by
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for asylum based on his fiance's forced abortion by Chinese
officials. 10 6 The issue of marital status was again central. Chen
reasoned that the C-Y-Z- spousal eligibility rule should extend to
him because-although he and his fianc6e never married-they
would have married had Chinese law allowed marriages by
citizens his age. 10 7 Specifically, Chen argued that the BIA's
interpretation of the 1996 Amendment-that a husband but not
a fianc6 of a victim is per se eligible for asylum-is "arbitrary,
capricious, and irrational."'' 0 8
The immigration judge ("IJ") held that Chen qualified for
asylum because the facts of his case fell "by analogy" within the
C-Y-Z- principle of extending eligibility to a spouse.10 9 The BIA
reversed, however, on the grounds that the agency did not extend
C-Y-Z- in prior decisions to the unmarried partners of forced
abortion victims. 110 The Third Circuit upheld this decision, thus
adopting a view contrary to that of the Ninth Circuit in Ma.111
In Chen, however, the Third Circuit, in applying step two of
Chevron deference-whether the agency's construction of the
statute was reasonable-limited its review to the distinction
drawn by the BIA between married and unmarried couples. 112
The court declined to assess whether the underlying C-Y-Z-
interpretation of the 1996 Amendment was, in fact,
permissible.113 Specifically, the court held that the BIA's decision
not to extend C-Y-Z- was reasonable in light of the agency's
"crushing caseload[s]," 114 its need to avoid problems of proof,115
recently appointed Supreme Court Justice (then Judge) Samuel Alito.
106 Id. at 222.
107 Id. At the time in question, Chen was nineteen, and his fianc6e was eighteen.
Id. at 223.
108 Id. at 224.
109 Id. at 223.
110 Id.
11 Id. at 222 ("[Tjhe BIA's interpretation, which contributes to efficient
administration and avoids difficult and problematic factual inquiries, is
reasonable."). The Fifth Circuit similarly upheld the BIA's determination that the
spousal rule did not extend to fianc~s, adopting, in its entirety, the reasoning of the
Third Circuit in Chen. See Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th Cir. 2004).
112 Chen, 381 F.3d at 227.
113 Id. ("[1]f C-Y-Z-'s interpretation is permissible (and we assume for the sake of
argument that it is), the distinction that the BIA has drawn between married and
unmarried couples satisfies step two of Chevron.").
114 Id. at 228 (quoting Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2003)).
115 Id. (noting the difficulty implicit in proving paternity when a male applicant
claims to have fathered an illegitimate child who was forcibly aborted).
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and the 1,000-person-per-year cap imposed on asylum grants
under the language of the 1996 Amendment. 116 The court
ultimately determined that Chevron deference was appropriate
because a bright-line marriage rule-used by courts in other
areas of the law--could not possibly be considered arbitrary,
capricious, and irrational. 1 7 The Third Circuit further held that
the rule was reasonable despite excluding those who tried to
procure a legal marriage yet who were prevented from doing so
because of China's age requirements. 18
D. Lin v. United States Department of Justice
The Second Circuit in Lin split the difference between the
contrary approaches of Ma and Chen in assessing
fianc6/boyfriend eligibility for asylum. The court reviewed the
denials of asylum of three applicants: two boyfriends of direct
victims of coercive family planning policies, and one fianc6. 11 9
The immigration judges in all three cases denied asylum on the
grounds that the BIA did not extend its C-Y-Z- interpretation to
fianc6s or boyfriends of direct victims. 20 The BIA affirmed
without opinion in each of the three cases. 12'
The Second Circuit first held that an immigration judge's
statutory construction-like that affirmed here by the BIA-was
not entitled to deference under the Chevron principle.1 22 As a
116 Cf. id. at 229 (emphasizing the limited number of spots permitted by
Congress for asylum claims).
117 Id. at 227 n.6.
1s Id. at 229-31. The court found that every country has the right to regulate
the age at which couples can legally marry, and that China's age limit could not be
deemed to be unduly burdensome. Id. at 230.
119 Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2005).
120 Id. at 188-89. In the first case, petitioner Lin claimed asylum eligibility
based on his girlfriend's forced abortion. Id. at 188. The IJ denied Lin's application
on the ground that, based on the 1,000-person-per-year cap on asylum grants under
the language of the 1996 Amendment, a grant to an unmarried partner may "open[]
the immigration floodgates to non-spouses ... [and] jeopardize the ability of those
individuals more directly harmed... to secure immigration relief." Id. In the second
case, petitioner Zou also claimed eligibility based on his girlfriend's forced abortion.
Id. The judge's analysis was merely that there was "absolutely no way" that the
language of the 1996 Amendment or existing case law applied to Zou's claim. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). In the third case, petitioner Dong sought asylum
in connection with his fianc6e's two forced abortions, and a threat toward him of
forcible sterilization. Id. at 188-89. The IJ denied eligibility based on the BIA's
refusal to extend such status to unmarried partners or fianc6s. Id.
121 Id. at 189.
122 Id. at 187.
2006] 1323
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
result, it was unable to review such decisions, remanding the
case back to the BIA for a more reasoned explanation of why
spouses, but not fianc6s and boyfriends, are per se eligible for
asylum status.123 Returning to the issue of review, the court
found Chevron deference inapplicable in situations where
opinions of immigration judges were summarily affirmed, often
without opinion, by the BIA.124 Immigration judges, the court
reasoned, lack the "juridical power" to issue binding decisions. 125
As to the substantive rationale for the bright-line marriage
rule, the Second Circuit found it impossible to conduct a
meaningful analysis of the BIA's interpretation of the language
of the 1996 Amendment. 126 Unlike the Third Circuit in Chen, the
court was unable to separate the reasoning of C-Y-Z-, that
spouses are per se eligible, from that of the BIA's subsequent
determination that fianc6s and boyfriends must be denied
eligibility. The Second Circuit held that, because the BIA never
explained its rationale for spousal eligibility under the 1996
Amendment, 27 and because the C-Y-Z- decision provides at least
a partial basis for denying eligibility to fianc6s and boyfriends,
remand to the BIA for additional explanation was required. 128
IV. WHY CHEN AND MA ERRED, BUT LIN DREW
A PERFECT BALANCE
A. Chen's Error
At first glance, the Third Circuit's approval in Chen of the
BIA's bright-line marriage rule appeals to one's notion of common
sense. After all, as the court pointed out, there are many other
areas of the law which use marital status as a proxy for dealing
123 Id.
124 Id. at 189-90.
125 Id. at 190. The court also held that "a summarily affirmed IJ
decision ... cannot be construed as a 'rule' promulgated by the BIA on behalf of the
Attorney General," due to the fact that when the BIA summarily affirms, it approves
only "the result reached ... [and] it does not necessarily imply approval of all of the
[decision's] reasoning." Id.
126 Id. at 191 ("[B]ecause the BIA failed, in C-Y-Z-, to articulate a reasoned basis
for making spouses eligible for asylum. .. IJs cannot possibly advance principled-
let alone persuasive-reasons to distinguish between, on the one hand, the BIA's
decision to create spousal eligibility ... and, on the other hand, the eligibility of
boyfriends and fianc6s under that same statutory provision.").
127 Id. at 192.
128 Id. at 187.
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with problems of proof and for adjudicating claims.129 A closer
look, however, reveals both substantive difficulties with the rule
itself, as well as problems with the Third Circuit's method of
review.
The substantive problem with the bright-line marriage
rule-while admittedly more ambiguous than the problems posed
by the Third Circuit's review of that rule--comes in two forms.
First, a grant of per se eligibility to a legally married husband,
but not to a fianc6 or boyfriend, is incompatible with the concept
of equal treatment of asylum applicants.' 30 The resistance and
trauma suffered by a fianc6e or girlfriend could conceivably rise
to a significantly higher level of persecution than that
experienced by a legally married wife. Take a hypothetical
situation, for example, where a husband receives imputed
persecution based on his wife's single forced abortion, yet a fianc6
remains ineligible despite his five-year relationship with a
woman having suffered several forced abortions, who was
ultimately abducted and forcibly sterilized. Similarly, a husband
loyal to the PRC and supportive of its policies may nonetheless be
imputed the persecution of his forcibly sterilized wife, while a
boyfriend who vehemently opposes such practices will not.'3 '
Both of these hypothetical situations, while extreme, demon-
strate that the marital status rule can result in finding an
applicant who has arguably suffered greater persecution-by way
of imputed political opinion-ineligible for asylum, while finding
an applicant who has suffered less, or no, persecution as per se
eligible. This strays from the established process of adjudicating
asylum claims, which, as stated above, inquires into the
applicant's status as a refugee by examining whether the
applicant was in fact persecuted. 32 Moreover, there is a strong
human rights argument for adjudicating claims by looking to the
129 See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 227 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004) (mentioning
income tax, welfare benefits, property, inheritance, and testimonial privilege).
130 See In re Y-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601, 619 (BIA 2003) (Board Member, Pauley,
dissenting) (positing that the BIA's holding in C-Y-Z- is "(at least arguably) at odds
with.., notions of equivalent treatment and analysis"); see also Barroso v. Gonzales,
429 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming the approach taken in Ma and
rejecting statutory constructions that lead to absurd results).
131 See Y-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 619 (Board Member, Pauley, dissenting)
(providing a similar example).
132 See Wines, supra note 38, at 699 (laying out the four-part test used to
determine whether an alien may properly be classified as a "refugee").
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severity of the harm, eschewing formalistic rules such as marital
status. 33 Focusing on the severity of the harm, in addition,
comports with the idea that Congress intended the 1996
Amendment to operate within the established context of asylum
law, not to exist as a separate definitional provision.' 34
A second substantive argument in opposition to the bright-
line rule is that it conflicts with the congressional intent for
enacting the 1996 Amendment. As the Ninth Circuit in Ma
pointed out, Congress sought relief for "couples;" the legislative
history makes no mention of marriage itself.135 If one accepts
that persecution as a result of forced abortion can be imputed to
a legally married husband, why cannot the same level of
persecution be imputed to a husband whose only distinction is
that he has been married in a traditional ceremony which, on
account of China's family planning policies, is not legally
recognized? Such a result is tantamount to a judgment that the
family bond created by a traditional marriage does not rise to the
level of that borne by a legally recognized marriage. 136 Moreover,
this result could readily lead to the breakup of family units by
allowing only one spouse asylum, forcing the other to remain in
his home country. 137 Congress sought to protect "anyone whose
'human rights' are threatened by a coercive family planning
policy,"13 8 and intended claims to be adjudicated on a case-by-
case basis, rather than by use of bright-line rules. 139 To be fair-
minded, it must be noted that the Third Circuit's analysis
133 See Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 733, 779 (1998) (stating that a focus on human rights would "ensure that
morally equivalent threats are treated alike").
134 See H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 (1996) ("[T]he burden of proof
remains on the applicant ... to establish ... that he or she has been subject to
persecution ... or has a well-founded fear of such treatment.").
135 See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing H.R. REP. No.
104-469, pt. 1, at 174).
136 Admittedly, this argument is stronger for a husband married in a traditional
ceremony than for a boyfriend or fianc6 who has not participated in a consummation
ceremony.
137 See Ma, 361 F.3d at 561.
138 Yuan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Zhao v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 92 (2d Cir. 2001)).
139 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 174 ("Determining ... whether the
actual or threatened harm rises to the level of persecution is a difficult and complex
task, but no more so in the case of claims based on coercive family planning than in
cases based on other factual situations. Asylum officers and immigration judges are
capable of making such judgments.").
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included the 1,000-person-per-year cap on the number of
applicants granted asylum under the language of the 1996
Amendment. 140 Yet while such a cap partially justifies using the
bright-line marriage rule, the cap, as the Second Circuit pointed
out,14' was lifted in 2005;142 as such, it cannot currently serve as
a basis for upholding the marital distinction adopted by the
BIA.I4 3
On balance, one must appreciate that the Third Circuit was
restrained by its determination that Chevron deference applied.
That is, its task was to gauge whether the bright-line marriage
rule was arbitrary, capricious, and irrational. 144 Yet the court's
exercise of review is itself seriously flawed. First, Chen granted
Chevron deference to a BIA interpretation with no grounding in
actual statutory language. Chevron deference is proper when an
administrative agency promulgates a "permissible construction of
the statute."'145 Here, however, no statutory language appears in
the discussion of the rule's validity.' 46 One must therefore
140 See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 225, 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2004).
141 Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 188 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005).
142 See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(g), 119 Stat. 231, 305.
143 See Leary, supra note 22, at 312-13 (arguing that the U.S. should stop
adopting numerical limitations on specific groups of asylum seekers, positing that
such caps violate our "affirmative commitment[s] to asylum seekers in pursuance of
[our] treaty obligation[s]").
144 See Chen, 381 F.3d at 227 n.6 (explaining that the court would not find the
bright-line test here to be unreasonable, as "the marriage relation is used in so many
areas of the law (income tax, welfare benefits, property, inheritance, testimonial
privilege, etc.) that it would seem absurd to characterize reliance on marital status
in C- Y-Z- as arbitrary and capricious.").
145 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
146 See Chen, 381 F.3d at 227-31. The court states that the BIA separately
determined that Chen's own experiences-that he suffered beatings and denial of a
marriage license-did not rise to the level of persecution. Id. at 234-35. This is a
much more appropriate basis for rejection of his claim, because it fits with the
established process of adjudicating claims on a case-by-case basis, and specifically
addresses the level of harm suffered by the applicant, evaluating whether that harm
rises to the level of persecution. Moreover, reference to whether the applicant was
persecuted is rooted in the statutory language of the 1996 Amendment, namely, that
an applicant resisting coercive family planning policies has not automatically
demonstrated persecution, but rather must show that he "has been persecuted for
failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive
population control program." Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act of 1996 § 601, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2000). The problem with
the Third Circuit's reasoning remains, however, because a large portion of the
opinion is devoted to upholding the marital-status rule. Despite this concern, the
decision now stands as precedent for future courts.
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question whether the statute itself, rather than some other
principle, was actually "constructed."147 In general, a court must
bear in mind that when evaluating an asylum claim, it should
usually rely on the statutory definition set forth by the relevant
statutory language.' 48
The second flaw in the Third Circuit's reasoning flows
inescapably from the first. Rather than identifying the specific
reasoning upon which the BIA interpretation was based, the
court engaged in an undue amount of speculation and inference.
For example, when discussing potential rationales for the bright-
line marriage rule, the court used language such as "the BIA
might reasonably have chosen to avoid,"'149 or "we may say that
the BIA 'logically could have concluded,' ' 150 or "[a]s we
" 151understand it, C-Y-Z- uses marital status as a rough way ....
Such wording suggests that the Chen court was unable to
pinpoint the specific basis upon which the BIA distinguished
between legally married and traditionally married husbands,
boyfriends, and fianc6s. This is problematic, because a court is
"not at liberty to search the law and the record for reasoning to
support the BIA's decision."152 The concept of judicial deference
entails recognition that the BIA has primary authority to
interpret immigration laws. 5 3 Thus, the court should have
147 See Yuan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 192, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2005)
(stating that although the court had "afford[ed] ... deference" to the BIA's rule in a
prior decision, the BIA had merely relied on an INS concession, which itself never
explained why it took that position). I submit that it is inappropriate to uphold a
subsequent interpretation-that fianc6s and boyfriends do not qualify-if that
subsequent interpretation is based on an unreasoned prior interpretation that
married spouses do qualify. Cf. Jiang v. Gonzales, No. 03-40661-AG, 2005 WL
2660391, at *1 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding an adverse credibility determination but
again calling for clarification of the C- Y-Z- bright-line test).
148 See Wes Henricksen, Abay v. Ashcroft: The Sixth Circuit's Baseless
Expansion of INA § 101(a)(42)(A) Revealed a Gap in Asylum Law, 80 WASH. L. REV.
477, 494 (2005) (arguing that, rather than pointing to a "governing principle," the
court should have applied the statutory definition of "refugee" when evaluating the
claim (internal quotation marks omitted)).
149 Chen, 381 F.3d at 228 (emphasis added).
150 Id. (emphasis added).
151 Id. at. 227 (emphasis added).
152 Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2003). But cf.
Mariuta v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 361, 367 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the case because the BIA's reasons for denying to reconsider the
petitioner's motion were undeniably clear).
153 See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) ("mhe BIA should be
accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms 'concrete
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recognized the BIA's "construction" as unreasoned, and ordered
the case remanded, rather than inserting its own reasoning.
154
Such an approach-which allows the BIA to elucidate a rationale
stemming directly from its experience and expertise in the area
of asylum law-permits appellate courts to conduct a cogent
review of sound statutory construction.' 55
The court's third and perhaps most fundamental error is
that it inappropriately divorced the C-Y-Z- holding from the
BIA's subsequent marital status rule, when in fact the two
interpretations cannot actually be separated.1 56  The Third
Circuit reasoned that, in applying Chevron deference, it is
required to analyze not whether the C-Y-Z- interpretation is
permissible, but only whether the marital status rule alone is
arbitrary, capricious, and irrational.1 57 Yet, as the Third Circuit
itself noted, the BIA denied relief, at least in part, because
"C-Y-Z- had not been extended to include unmarried partners."
158
The interesting aspect of the court's refusal to assess the validity
of the interpretation in C-Y-Z- is that it still seemed implicitly to
recognize C-Y-Z-'s importance. The Third Circuit undertook a
lengthy discussion of C-Y-Z-'s holding, even analyzing potential
rationales that could have served as the basis for extending
eligibility to unmarried spouses.1 59 It is submitted, therefore,
meaning.' ").
154 See Guendelsberger, supra note 49, at 644. Alternatively, the court could
have pointed out the problems with the bright-line marriage rule, but still upheld
denial of asylum based on the applicant's failure to demonstrate persecution; this
assumes, of course, that the BIA first presented a reasoned analysis of this issue.
155 See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002) (per curiam) (explaining how the
agency can gather evidence, apply its "expertise," and make initial conclusions that
can then help the court).
156 See Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that
the C-Y-Z- decision forms at least part of the basis for denying eligibility to
boyfriends or fianc6s); see also In re Y-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601, 619 (BIA 2003)
(Board Member, Pauley, dissenting) (arguing that an assessment of whether a
spouse, who was married only by traditional ceremony, can assert past persecution
requires that the underlying reasoning of C- Y-Z- first be resolved).
157 See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2004). The court in Chen
assumed that if the C-Y-Z- rule is not permissible, then the statute applies only to
persons upon whom a forced abortion or sterilization procedure has actually been
performed. See id. This may be true, but it is within the authority of the BIA, not the
circuit court, to make such a determination.
158 Id. at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted).
159 Id. at 225-27 ("Two rationales seem possible.... The first would proceed on
the assumption that the persecution of one spouse by means of a forced abortion or
sterilization causes the other spouse to experience intense sympathetic suffering
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that it is not the bright-line marital status rule itself that is
clearly arbitrary and capricious, but rather the use of that rule as
drawn from the C-Y-Z- holding, which provides no explicit
explanation for extending per se persecution eligibility to
husbands. A poorly reasoned affirmative grant of asylum as the
source for an unreasoned denial of asylum strays too far from the
explicit language of the statute, and should not stand. 160
B. Ma's Error
The Ninth Circuit in Ma committed a different error, though
its analysis also intruded upon the BIA's authority in this
context. Unlike in Chen, the Ma court held that Chevron
deference was inappropriate based on its determination that the
BIA's chosen construction of the 1996 Amendment would lead to
absurd results. 161 In particular, it reasoned that such a rule
would result in unequal treatment, and may potentially lead to
the breakup of families. 162 The court recognized, however, that
the BIA's marital status rule, to an extent, "adopted the
underlying reasoning and holding"163 of C-Y-Z-. Moreover, the
court clearly approved of the result in C-Y-Z-, both explicitly 164
and implicitly, by extending asylum eligibility to Ma. 165
The court erred in that, having recognized C-Y-Z- as
intertwined with the BIA's interpretation, it never addressed the
inadequate reasoning in that case. Rather, it provided an
alternative construction of the statute-namely, that husbands
whose marriages would be legally recognized but for China's
coercive family planning policies are also eligible for asylum
based on the imputed persecution of their forcibly sterilized
spouse. If Chevron deference does not apply-that is, if the
that rises to the level of persecution.... The second possible rationale... [is] the
impact on the latter's ability to reproduce and raise children.").
160 See Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 812 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
court is "not authorized to affirm unreasoned decisions" (quoting Iao v. Gonzales,
400 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
161 See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004).
162 Id. at 561.
163 See id. at 557.
164 See id. at 559 (citing legislative history); see also He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d
593, 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing the BIA rule that the forcible sterilization of
one spouse is an act of persecution against the other).
165 By having extended eligibility to Ma, an unrecognized husband, the court
must have logically approved of the extension of eligibility to a legally married
spouse as in In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 919 (BIA 1997).
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chosen construction is arbitrary and produces an absurd result-
then a court has the legal duty only to remand, and not to put
forth its own reasoning.166 The Ma court thus intruded upon the
BIA's authority as the primary interpreter of asylum legislation.
C. Lin's Insightful and Cautious Approach
In Lin, the Second Circuit adopted the most measured and
appropriate approach to the BIA's interpretation. The court
recognized that the C-Y-Z- holding provides a significant basis
for the BIA's bright-line marriage rule, but that in C-Y-Z-, the
BIA provided no reasoned analysis for its holding. Based on this
insight, the Second Circuit also understood that any analysis of
the bright-line marriage rule would be similarly unreasoned. By
remanding, the Second Circuit avoided insertion of its own
statutory construction, and appropriately exercised Chevron
deference-by determining that, in this case, such deference did
not apply under Mead. While considerable deference should
generally be afforded the BIA, the Second Circuit correctly
recognized that the decisions of numerous immigration judges,
summarily affirmed, cannot possibly stand as binding precedent.
Moreover, remand is consistent not only with Mead, but with the
general principle of preserving the BIA's primary authority to
interpret immigration laws. Remand is especially prudent in
light of the BIA's recent failure to recognize even its own cursory
reasoning in C-Y-Z-, practically denying the existence of a circuit
split as to its marital status rule. 167
CONCLUSION
In evaluating the BIA marital status rule, the logical
starting point is to ask why a legally married husband can
essentially stand in the shoes of his persecuted wife. There may
indeed be some legitimate and well-reasoned grounds for
extending asylum status to legally married spouses, despite the
166 See Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the BIA has the duty to explain its reasoning and that "supporting a result
reached by the agency with reasoning not explicitly relied on by the agency"
represents an intrusion on the agency's authority). The court in Ma did, in fact,
remand; however, it set forth an analysis upon which the BIA's decision was to
conform. See Ma, 361 F.3d at 561.
167 Cf. In re E-L-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 814, 824-25 (BIA 2005) (implying that
precedent has been uniformly applied in various cases).
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fact that such applicants do not fall within the explicit language
of the 1996 Amendment. Several commentators, for example,
have posited a human rights basis for rules developed by the BIA
in this area. 168 At the same time, the BIA has reason to adopt a
bright-line marriage rule based on its need to distinguish
between applicants, to deal with problems of proof, and to remain
faithfully within the boundaries of the statutory language.
The evolution of Chevron deference and the streamlining
procedures are also very significant. Clearly, Congress-by
recently stripping the federal courts of partial jurisdiction over
BIA decisions-and the Supreme Court-in Chevron and its
progeny-have firmly limited an appellate court's power to
review administrative judgments. An important question is
whether either Congress or the Court envisioned the
development of rules promulgated upon virtually no explanatory
rationale whatsoever. The emerging tension manifests itself in
the fact that the streamlining procedures, at times, allow
unreasoned interpretations to stand in the name of efficiency. 169
In this context, the Second Circuit's measured view of
judicial deference may be an especially useful approach for
ensuring reasoned analyses. Additional cases on the same issue
168 See Abrams, supra note 37, at 905 ("The analysis of what constitutes a
coercive population program should incorporate current international consensus on
the definition and scope of reproductive rights."); Steinbock, supra note 133, at 803-
04 (arguing that although a focus on human rights may stray from the statutory
refugee definition, such a focus is consistent with the purposes of providing asylum);
Inna Nazarova, Comment, Alienating "Human" from "Right" U.S. and UK Non-
Compliance with Asylum Obligations Under International Human Rights Law, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1335, 1417 (2002) ("International guarantees to asylum seekers
must remain binding rules of law, which civilized nations respect."); see also C- Y-Z-,
21 I. & N. Dec. at 925 (Board Member Rosenberg, concurring) (referencing United
Nations materials in determining refugee status).
169 See Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 560-61 (7th Cir. 2004)
(remanding cases for clarification of reasons for denying asylum, stating that this
instance "is one more indication of systemic failure by the judicial officers of the
immigration service to provide reasoned analysis for the denial of applications for
asylum"); see also Scott D. Pollock, Survey of Illinois Law: 2004-2005 Developments
in Seventh Circuit Jurisprudence: Protecting Foreign Nationals Against Return to
Countries Where They Fear Persecution or Torture, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 723, 723 (2005)
(describing the view of the Seventh Circuit, and particularly Judge Posner, that the
BIA and immigration judges engage in substantial misapplication of "elementary
principles of adjudication") (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Krastev v. INS,
292 F.3d 1268, 1279 (10th Cir. 2002) (cautioning the BIA that its practice of
assuming factual credibility, without actually deciding, is "not favored" by the court).
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continue to reach the courts. 170 Moreover, spousal eligibility is
not the only issue under the 1996 Amendment which has been
recently litigated.171  Another central question as to the
Amendment's language-and which has been largely un-
answered by the BIA-asks which applicants qualify as having
been "persecuted ... for other resistance to a coercive population
control program."' 72 The Ninth Circuit was the first to address
this issue in depth; 73 however, subsequent cases have been
remanded to the BIA for clarification. 174 By remanding these
issues, it is clear that the courts are calling for the BIA to provide
reasoned interpretations of the 1996 Amendment.
170 See, e.g., Bin v. Gonzales, 154 Fed. Appx. 273, 275 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding
to BIA based on the same reasoning given in Lin v. United States Department of
Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 2005)); see also Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d
217, 218-19 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (remanding for the BIA to construe the word
"persecution"); Ci Pan v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 449 F.3d 408, 409 (2d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (remanding to the BIA to determine whether a boyfriend could qualify as a
refugee); Long v. Gonzales, 130 Fed. Appx. 85, 87 (9th Cir. 2005) (mem.) (remanding
to the BIA to decide if a husband was eligible for imputed persecution despite being
divorced at the time of his asylum appeal).
171 See Yuan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 192, 194 (2d. Cir. 2005) (holding
that parents are not per se eligible for political asylum).
172 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996
§ 601, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2000); see Abrams, supra note 37, at 905 (stating
that the 1996 Amendment "clearly leaves open the possibility that coercive
population policies encompass methods other than involuntary abortion or
sterilization.").
173 See Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004) (asking whether those
persecuted for "other resistance" include a woman "subjected to a forced
gynecological exam and threatened with future abortion, sterilization of her
boyfriend, and arrest," and answering affirmatively); see also Zhang v. Ashcroft,
395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting in dicta that merely impregnating a
girlfriend does not constitute "[other] resistance" for that man within the meaning of
the statute).
174 See Chen v. Gonzales, 152 Fed. Appx. 92, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding to
the BIA for its failure to adequately address all of petitioner's evidence in relation to
her claim that she resisted China's coercive population control program); Yang v.
U.S. Att'y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1205 (11th Cir. 2005) (remanding to the BIA to
determine whether privately removing an IUD could be considered "other
resistance"); Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2005) (remanding to
the BIA for failure to properly explain why the plaintiff did not meet her burden of
proof given that she was repeatedly subjected to involuntary insertion of IUDs); Lin
v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 757 (7th Cir. 2004) (remanding to the BIA to determine, in
part, whether petitioner's efforts to remove IUDs inserted involuntarily are the type
of "[other] resistance" that Congress sought to protect); see also Yuan, 416 F.3d at
197-98 (noting that the BIA has not yet definitively interpreted the "other
resistance" statutory language).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
It may be entirely appropriate for the BIA to adopt a
relatively restrained interpretation about who qualifies under
the 1996 Amendment. The BIA may even determine that asylum
law is not the most appropriate vehicle for providing relief to a
potentially unlimited number of family members. 175 Whatever
the outcome, courts operating within the context of current
asylum law must keep two principles in mind: first, the BIA
holds primary responsibility for issuing reasoned interpretations
of immigration laws, and second, if unreasoned interpretations
do in fact surface, remand is the best vehicle for avoiding
intrusion upon that agency's authority.
175 See Wang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 134, 143-44 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding the
BIA's determination that the child of a direct victim of a forced abortion is not
eligible for asylum merely by virtue of his mother's experience).
1334 [Vol. 80:1307
